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I. INTRODUCTION
Special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and
our law and that principle has special resonance when government seeks to constrain a
person's ability to speak there. Most Americans would be understandably dismayed,
given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display from their window an 8 by 11-
inch sign expressing their political views. 1
The concept of the home as a zone of nearly unfettered
individual liberty is one of the bedrock principles of American law and
culture. Chief among the liberties safeguarded from governmental
interference within this zone is freedom of speech, a liberty protected
by the First Amendment. 2 While the First Amendment prevents the
government from infringing on an individual's speech in many
settings, its protection is especially strong in the home. As Justice
Stevens wrote in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, any attempt by the
1. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech...."). As originally construed, the First Amendment prohibited only the federal
government from interfering with free speech, but the Court's incorporation of the Bill of Rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment made the prohibition applicable to the States as well. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
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government to prohibit certain forms of speech in the home is so
antithetical to our common understanding of individual liberty that it
is likely to arouse impassioned opposition.
For millions of Americans, 3 however, certain aspects of the
protection that the First Amendment typically provides do not extend
to their private residences because they live in a community governed
by a homeowner association. In the name of property value and
aesthetic coherence, many of these associations impose myriad
restrictions on their member-homeowners. One common restriction
prohibits the display of political signs on a homeowner's private
property. 4 While such a regulation from a local municipality would
clearly contravene the First Amendment, homeowner associations
have not been held to this standard because of their legal status as
private entities. 5 Thus, by virtue of living in an association-governed
community, millions of Americans have signed away their ability to
display political signs on their property, one of the most significant
acts of political speech commonly practiced across the nation.
As communities governed by homeowner associations have
proliferated in recent years,6 limitations on the display of political
signs have alarmed scholars and homeowners alike and prompted a
variety of responses from both groups. 7 Some scholars argue that the
status of homeowner associations as purely private entities is not so
clear-cut.8  Given their expanding role in administering local
3. As of 2004, it was estimated that approximately 54.6 million Americans live in
association-governed communities. Community Association Institute, Data on U.S. Community
Associations, http://www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
4. The specifics of the prohibition vary from association to association, but sign bans of
some kind are sufficiently common in association-governed communities across the country.
Some associations ban all signs other than "For Sale" signs; thus, political signs are included
within this general prohibition.
5. The scholarly debate concerning the private v. public character of homeowner
associations has been robust, but to date most courts still recognize them as private entities. For
further discussion, see infra Parts III.B. 1, III.C.
6. In 1970, there were approximately 10,000 association-governed communities in the
United States. In 2005, there were approximately 274,000. Community Association Institute,
Data on U.S. Community Associations, http://www.caionline.org/about/explanation.cfm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2006).
7. Litigation between homeowners and associations over covenant enforcement issues has
become increasingly common in recent years. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA 132 (1994)
(observing that "covenant enforcement litigation has become a profitable legal specialization for
attorneys in states with many [common interest developments]"); Laura Castro Trognitz, 'Yes,
It's My Castle'- Suits By Unhappy Residents Against Homeowners' Associations Grow, 86 A.B.A.
J. 30, 30-31 (2000) (providing examples of the types of litigation pursued by the "growing
number of association residents who are taking their disputes to court").
8. See ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 87-103 (1992) (discussing competing views on the
benefits and costs of the way in which formation of homeowners associations permit "load
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communities 9 and their prevalence in certain regions of the country, 10
homeowner associations undeniably cast a shadow that extends
beyond the private realm. Certain commentators characterize
homeowner associations as "quasi-governmental organization[s]" 11 and
"private governments." 12 Courts, however, have been hesitant to label
them as state actors and impose the full breadth of constitutional
restrictions that normally attach to such actors.
Given the complexity of the legal issues presented by
homeowner associations and their relative novelty in the legal
landscape, finding the appropriate legal framework under which to
analyze their actions is a difficult task. Additionally, hot-button social
and political issues, such as classism and racism, are frequently
injected into the debate, complicating matters further. 13 As a result of
this confluence of legal, social, and political considerations,
homeowner associations are not easily reducible to one particular legal
paradigm. The wide variety of approaches found in both the academic
literature and the case law reflects this ongoing struggle to
successfully characterize the legal dimensions of the homeowner
association and the consequent ramifications on both members and
non-members. 14  This Note will examine the existing analytical
approaches to homeowner associations and suggest that, at least in
the context of political sign bans, there is a strong argument for a new
approach based on the policies underlying the traditional protection
accorded free speech.
shedding" by local governments and changes "the nature of public service delivery systems in
many communities across the United States"); MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 122-49 (discussing
the role of homeowner associations as private governments); Uriel Reichman, Residential Private
Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976) ("While the 'governmental'
features of homeowners' associations cannot be denied, these entities are, nevertheless, of a
private' nature.").
9. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.4.
10. Homeowner associations govern more than half of all housing for sale in the fifty largest
metropolitan areas in the United States. Additionally, approximately 70 percent of existing
associations are concentrated in two regions of the country: the east and west coasts. DILGER,
supra note 8, at 18-19.
11. David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations As State Actors: Regulating the Impact
of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L. J. 761, 768 (1995).
12. Reichman, supra note 8, at 253; see DILGER, supra note 8, at 87-103 (discussing the role
of homeowner associations in providing services traditionally supplied by local governments);
MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 122-49 (discussing the role of homeowner associations as private
governments).
13. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 761.
14. See id. ("Residential associations and gated communities often restrict nonmembers'
freedom of speech, limit nonmembers' freedom of movement, and engage in racial discrimination
against nonmembers.").
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Some critics might dismiss the display of a political sign on
one's front lawn as a trivial form of speech. The Supreme Court,
however, has characterized political signs as "a venerable means of
communication that is both unique and important."15 With the ideal
of traditional "town hall" democracy relegated to the dustbin of myth
and history, the political sign is as valid, and accessible, a form of
political communication as any other currently available to the vast
majority of voters. Beyond accessibility, political signs are important
because they directly reflect the way that citizens feel about political
candidates. This, in turn, ultimately impacts the outcome of elections
and the trajectory of substantive government policy-there is hardly
an endeavor more significant in a democratic society.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Following the introduction,
Part II examines the growth of homeowner associations across the
United States as well as their unique structure, function, and legal
characteristics. Part III reviews the analytical frameworks that
courts and commentators employ when considering how to regulate
homeowner associations and argues that these approaches are flawed,
especially in the context of political sign bans. Finally, Part IV
proposes a new approach to association bans on political signs based
on the public policy exception found in traditional contract law.
Specifically, this public policy approach focuses on the substantial
societal interests in: (1) preserving the ability of individuals to freely
express themselves in their homes; and (2) promoting open and honest
discourse relating to electoral politics.
The proposal outlined in Part IV is firmly rooted in the two
current approaches to regulating homeowner associations: the
contractual approach and the constitutional approach. Both
approaches have significant strengths and weaknesses. The proposal
offered by this Note attempts to capitalize on the best aspects of each
approach while minimizing the negative aspects. The proposal
reaffirms the sound policy of generally enforcing homeowner
association restrictions but carves out a narrow exception based on the
significant negative consequences of over-regulating political signs.
The solution offered by this Note is not as drastic as it might
first seem given the long-standing common law tradition of allowing
courts to imply public policy exceptions to the general principle of
freedom of contract. The constitutional values embodied by political
signs are precisely the type that this limited exception was intended to
protect. Of course, such an approach poses the risk of judicial
arbitrariness and subjectivity. As a normative matter, this Note
15. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994).
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argues that such a risk is worth taking to protect a value as important
as political speech. Further, the risk is not so high in this context
because the public policy exception is narrowly confined to the realm
of political signs. Finally, the exception proposed by this Note is a
moderate one built upon the Supreme Court's well-established "time,
place, and manner" approach to unintentional infringements of
protected First Amendment speech.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Growth of Homeowner Associations
In twenty-first century America, it is becoming increasingly
difficult for individuals and families to realize the dream of home
ownership without also becoming a member of a homeowner
association. 16 Barely a blip on the housing radar screen a generation
ago, association-governed communities, sometimes referred to as
common interest communities, 17 have grown rapidly in many parts of
the country during the past several decades.' 8  As of 2003, an
estimated fifty million Americans lived in communities governed by
some type of homeowner association,' 9 and it is estimated that in the
past five to eight years more than 80 percent of new housing starts
16. Nomenclature varies widely throughout the country. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM
AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION LAW 13 (3d ed. 2000).
However, because the focus of this Note is on a certain type of community, see infra note 17, I
will refer to the associations that govern these developments as "homeowner associations" or
simply "associations." Other closely related and commonly used terms include: residential
community associations, residential associations, community associations, property owner
associations, and condominium associations. HYATT, supra, at 20-21.
17. Although there are several different types of common interest communities, see DILGER,
supra note 8, at 16-17 (explaining the other prominent types of common interest communities),
this Note will focus primarily on planned unit developments ("PUDs"). PUDs usually consist of
"single-family or multi.family housing, and open space or some other amenity." HYATT, supra
note 16, at 14. PUDs are typically detached structures, most commonly single-family homes,
which occupy their own lots. Id. I have chosen to focus on this type of association-governed
community because when considered alongside its counterparts, such as condominiums, for
example, it is the setting where the discourse concerning political sign bans is most likely to be
applicable.
18. See supra note 10.
19. The best source for determining the extent of association membership in the United
States is the membership list of the Community Association Institute ("CAI"). Despite the best
efforts of CAI to determine the total number of association-governed communities in the United
States, membership is voluntary and many smaller associations may have decided not to join;
thus, these figures may actually underestimate the actual totals. DILGER, supra note 8, at 18.
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have been part of an association-governed community. 20 In many
major metropolitan areas, association homes account for over 50
percent of all new home sales. 21
Developers rely on homeowner associations as their preferred
organizational form because they have proven to be highly
profitable. 22 Although it is hard to pinpoint one particular reason for
the increase in popularity, homeowner associations are thriving at
least in part because "they help protect home values, provide
affordable ownership opportunities, help meet the increased
privatization of services as local governments cut back, and are
efficient land planning, land use and conservation techniques." 23
Association living is also an appealing option for those who wish to
become homeowners but are "weary of crime, social ills, and the
inability of government to address these pressing concerns." 24
While the rise of association-governed communities has been
largely positive for homeowners, developers, and municipalities, its
effect on the broader social and political landscape is more difficult to
calculate. One commentator has described the emergence of
homeowner associations as a "quiet revolution" with far-reaching
effects on political and social arrangements across residential
communities throughout the country.25 Another commentator has
argued that associations impose substantial negative externalities on
non-members by developing exclusive communities and increasing the
fiscal burdens of both local and state governments. 26 Whether viewed
as a positive or negative force, the continuing expansion of homeowner
associations has had, and will continue to have, a profound impact on
a variety of diverse groups and interests in countless communities
across the country.
20. Community Association Institute, Data on U.S. Community Associations, http://www.
caionline.org/about/explanation.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
21. This includes the majority of new residential development in California, Florida, New
York, Texas, and suburban Washington, D.C. DILGER, supra note 8, at 18.
22. See id. at 5 (discussing the beginning of the "boom" in association housing during the
1980s).
23. Community Association Institute, Data on U.S. Community Associations, http://www.
caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
24. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 762.
25. Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of
Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 465 (1998).
26. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 761-64.
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B. Homeowner Associations: Structure and Function
1. Overview
There are three features that distinguish ownership of an
association home from traditional homeownership. 27  First, the
association holds title to the common property in the development and
the individual owners share ownership and access to this property by
virtue of their association membership. 28 Second, membership in the
homeowner association is automatic when new residents purchase
their homes; therefore, homeowners must abide by the usage
restrictions that run with the property. 29 Third, association members
must pay an "assessment," a fee that is used for maintenance of the
common property and other services. 30
Real estate developers have been the driving force behind the
growth of homeowner associations over the course of the last several
decades. Typically, a developer will lay the legal foundation for a
homeowner association long before any residents purchase their lots
or their homes. 31 The developer actually brings the association into
existence by recording a set of creating documents that typically
includes: a declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, plats, and
deeds. 32 One scholar has characterized these documents as "akin to a
state's constitution"33 because of their foundational nature and their
nearly immutable impact on the character of the community.
2. The Declaration and the Association Board
Most important among an association's founding documents is
the declaration. 34  Declarations are typically authored by the
developer and are normally only subject to amendment by a
supermajority vote of all the members in the homeowner association.35
27. Community Association Institute, A Brief Explanation of Community Associations,




31. DILGER, supra note 8, at 12-13.
32. HYATT, supra note 16, at 24-27.
33. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 127.
34. Declarations are also referred to as Declarations of Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions ("CC&R"). HYATT, supra note 16, at 24.
35. See MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 21 (explaining that "supermajority vote" typically
means three-fourths of all members in the homeowner association; not simply three-fourths of all
members who choose to vote).
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Because the amendment process usually requires at least two-thirds
of all members to approve the change, the existence of absentee
owners and renters makes the necessary vote totals very difficult to
secure. 36 The difficulties inherent in modifying the declaration mean
that "the developer's idea of how people should live is, to a large
extent, cast in concrete." 37
Assuming that the developer includes a ban on political signs
in the declaration, 38 a homeowner who wishes to challenge such a ban
faces a Sisyphean task. If she cannot command a two-thirds majority
vote to amend the declaration, she must challenge the restrictions in
court. 39  In most states, however, declaration restrictions are
enforceable against association residents absent a showing that they
are unreasonable. 40
Because the amendment process, as administered by the
association board, is the first line of recourse for any homeowner who
wishes to challenge a restriction, the form of the association board
itself is also an important consideration. One commentator has
characterized the majority of association boards as "illiberal and
undemocratic." 41  Similarly, another commentator has argued that
"[r]ather than participatory democracies, residents describe their
associations as operating at arm's length from individual residents."42
These criticisms emanate from the reality that association
boards are often inflexible, self-selecting bodies.43  Although
membership on the board of directors is typically open to all members
of the association in good standing,44 boards do not necessarily reflect
a broad cross-section of the popular sentiment within the community.
36. Id. at 127-28; see also DILGER, supra note 8, at 34 (detailing voting mechanisms
permitted for homeowners associations that would violate the constitutional principle of one
person, one vote if adopted by local governments, including the denial of voting rights to renters
and granting of voting rights to absentee owners).
37. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 127.
38. The other scenario would involve an association board adopting the sign ban at a later
date. This presents a separate issue related to the homeowner's consent to the restriction
provided the homeowner was a member of the association at the time the ban was adopted. See
infra Part III.B.
39. A challenge typically would be brought on traditional property law grounds.
40. Carl B. Kress, Comment, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a
Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837, 843 (1995).
41. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 21.
42. James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessing of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing
Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1, 62.
43. Association board members are typically counseled by lawyers and developers to
maintain "harsh enforcement" of the covenant regime in order to deter non-compliance.
MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 21, 131.
44. This means members who are not delinquent in paying the mandatory assessment fees.
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Because board members are typically uncompensated, they may be
comprised largely of individuals who have the greatest desire to
protect their own self-interest rather than those who wish to
unselfishly protect the best interests of the community at large.45 As a
result, boards may be composed of residents with "an authoritarian
bent" who enjoy exercising power over their neighbors.46  In
recognition of, and in response to this problem, many states have
enacted laws requiring boards to act in a more transparent fashion
with respect to their meeting schedules and rulemaking processes. 47
Even with added transparency, there is still no guarantee that
association boards will alter their behavior or become more receptive
to popular sentiment among the rank-and-file members of the
association community.
3. Involvement of Local Government
In addition to authoring a declaration that will create a
community and attract potential homebuyers, developers must take
the necessary steps to secure government approval for their planned
communities. They must write articles of incorporation and bylaws
that will garner the approval of local planning officials. 48 In many
instances, developers must undertake a small-scale lobbying effort to
procure the necessary approval from city officials for a new
development.
Despite the sometimes onerous approval process, local
governments generally encourage the development of association-
governed communities. 49  Local governments have tremendous
incentive to promote this type of growth because such communities
reduce overall expenses while simultaneously increasing the tax-
base. 50 Association-governed communities provide this benefit to local
governments by simultaneously attracting new residents to the
community while privatizing certain services formerly performed at
public expense. Thus, there are more taxpayers, but, theoretically,
less public expenditures.
45. There is at least some anecdotal evidence to support this proposition. See id. at 131-32.
46. Id. at 131.
47. ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 113-14 (1989).
48. DILGER, supra note 8, at 14.
49. Commentators have been eager to scrutinize the connection between homeowner
associations and local governments for a variety of reasons. One popular motivation for scrutiny
relates to the state action doctrine and the possible imposition of constitutional standards on
homeowner associations. For further discussion, see infra Part III.C.
50. Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34
DUQ. L. REV. 41, 53 (1995); DILGER, supra note 8, at 104-30.
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Local governments play an essential, yet underestimated, role
in the expansion of association-governed communities throughout the
country. 51 Indeed, some commentators contend that the growth of
association-governed communities would not have been possible if not
for the "plenary authority exercised by municipalities over the use and
development of land within their jurisdictions."52
4. The Association as Service Provider and Private Government
Planned community living is the area in which the association
serves its two primary, ongoing purposes: protecting property values
and life-style preferences.5 3 To achieve these goals, the homeowner
association performs four basic operational functions: (1) it maintains
common areas; (2) it arranges for delivery of services; (3) it taxes
members through regular and special assessments to pay for
amenities and services; and (4) it protects neighborhood aesthetics and
real estate values by enforcing the declaration. 54 In addition to these
core functions, homeowner associations may also provide other
services such as: day care; traffic regulation; street maintenance; park
and recreational facility maintenance; elementary schools; and law
enforcement and security. 55
What is striking about these functions is that they replicate
and supplement the functions that the local government performs.
They are viable-meaning residents are willing to pay for them-
because many believe that homeowner associations can deliver certain
services more efficiently and effectively than the local government.56
The prevailing wisdom is that, by administering the community,
homeowner associations not only deliver what residents need, but also
allow "people of similar backgrounds and values ... to join together to
create a strong sense of community at the local level."57 Both features
51. DILGER, supra note 8, at 104-30.
52. Siegel, supra note 25, at 520.
53. Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and
Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 205-
06 (1992); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 122 (stating that the homeowner association's
primary purpose is to protect property values).
54. DILGER, supra note 8, at 20-24.
55. George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25
URB. LAW. 335, 351-62 (1993).
56. See DILGER, supra note 8, at 87 (noting that public dissatisfaction with the public
sector's performance as a service provider resulted in a political atmosphere which is conducive
to private institutions such as RCAs); see also infra text accompanying note 61 (describing the
resistance to local taxes which can arise when municipal services are privatized and observing
that homeowners pay a special fee to their RCAs in addition to property taxes).
57. DILGER, supra note 8, at 131-44.
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have the added benefit of increasing property values. For this reason,
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ("ACIR")
Report on Residential Community Associations ("RCA") called the
trend in homeowner association growth "the most significant
privatization of public services in recent times."58 This same trend has
also led several commentators to characterize homeowner associations
as "private governments. '" 59
Unquestionably, homeowner associations play a formative role
in shaping the social and civic character of their members' lives.
Because residents look to their homeowner association for many
traditional municipal services, they are often more loyal to their
particular homeowner association than to their hometown
government. This loyalty arises, at least in part, because residents
feel that their homeowner association does a superior job of delivering
most, if not all, desired public goods and services formerly provided by
the local government. 60  Indeed, in many association-governed
communities, residents have protested against paying local taxes,
which they view as being duplicative of the assessments that they
already pay to their homeowner associations. 61
III. ANALYSIS: How SHOULD THE LAW TREAT HOMEOWNER
AsSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL SIGN BANS?
A. Overview
For many of the reasons detailed above, 62 the search for an
appropriate legal framework for the homeowner association has
frustrated legal scholars and courts. 63 Clean, categorical distinctions
are nearly impossible to come by when it comes to homeowner
associations. 64 Finding a framework for the homeowner association is
problematic because there is not one that can be "transferred
58. See id. at 9 (citing the ACIR Report).
59. See supra note 8. The term "private government" was first used to describe corporations.
Reichman, supra note 8, at 253.
60. See DILGER, supra note 8, at 61-86 (recognizing the growing trend toward privatization
in the United States and laying out the arguments in favor of and against privatization).
61. Id. at 102-03.
62. See supra Part II.B-C.
63. Brower, supra note 53, at 237-38.
64. Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Governments: The
State Will Make the Call,"30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 526 (1996).
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wholesale" to this context. 65 Part III will analyze two competing
approaches in an attempt to develop a coherent approach to this
challenging problem.
When characterizing the legal dimensions of homeowner
associations and how best to regulate them in light of their complex
structure, there are two predominant approaches: 66  (1) the
contractual/consent approach, which focuses on the belief that
associations are based on the consent of private parties; and (2) the
constitutional approach, which conceives of associations as mini-
governments that should be accorded state actor status.67
From the standpoint of a homeowner who wishes to litigate the
issue of political sign bans, neither of these approaches, in their purest
forms, offers much promise. Under a strict application of the
contractual/consent approach, assuming no fraud or duress in the
formation of the contract, the homeowner has no remedy because she
consented to the ban when she voluntarily purchased her home and
became a member of the association. Likewise, under a strict
application of the constitutional approach, the homeowner has no
redress. Although a ban on political signs from the local city council
would be an impermissible abridgement of free speech under the First
Amendment, courts do not typically find that homeowner associations
are state actors. Therefore, no First Amendment protection is
afforded to homeowners who live in privately operated homeowner
associations. Thus, a homeowner who wishes to display a political
sign on her front lawn has no remedy short of selling her house and
moving to a neighborhood that is not governed by an association.
The remainder of this Part will detail the basic elements of
these two analytical approaches, offer criticism of both approaches,
and identify elements from each that may be helpful in order to
develop a novel approach to the regulation of political signs in private
homeowner associations.
65. Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness" in Private Law: The
Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 53 (1990).
66. While there are several other frameworks that are also helpful here, such as trusts and
corporations, for the purposes of this Note, I have chosen to focus on what are clearly the two
most important approaches in current application.
67. Brower, supra note 53, at 238.
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B. Contractual /Consent Approach
1. Overview
The contractual/consent approach 68 to homeowner associations
is, for the most part, exactly what it suggests: a framework that views
associations as private organizations that should be governed
exclusively by contract law and property law, and that are not subject
to the constitutional rules that apply to state actors. 69 The basis for
this straightforward approach is the notion "that because all residents
agreed to the terms and conditions of the [association] rules, the
[association] regulations should be given great deference." 70 Thus, the
theory postulates that when a homeowner signs the contract to
purchase her home, she does so with actual or constructive knowledge
of the accompanying covenants that burden the real estate and she
thereby consents to these restrictions. As a result, the homeowner is
left with few, if any, contract or property law mechanisms at her
disposal if she wishes to challenge the restrictions to which she
previously "consented. ' 71
The key element of the contractual approach is the idea that
the homeowner gives actual consent to be bound by the particular
covenants and restrictions that affect her land and her usage of that
land. As Professor Epstein asserted quite succinctly, "[t]he logic of
contracting is the logic of unanimous consent."72 One major problem
with this idea of unanimous consent arises, however, if the consent is
not expressly given, but is assumed based on constructive notice of the
covenants or, worse yet, is completely fictionalized.
Professor Alexander further explained the theory behind the
contractual model with respect to covenants running with the land,
such as those that govern homeowner associations, and subsequent
purchasers:
The standard explanation used to reconcile running covenants with individual freedom
is that a legal system that holds a subsequent owner to a promise made by a predecessor
68. Hereafter, the contractual/consent approach will be referred to primarily as the
"contractual approach."
69. Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 64, at 528.
70. Brower, supra note 53, at 238.
71. When considering the merits of a homeowner's challenge to a particular regulation,
there is often a distinction drawn between restrictions that were part of the original declaration
and those subsequently added through the amendment process. This distinction has to do with
the unanimous vs. non-unanimous consent to be bound by certain restrictions. Brower, supra
note 53, at 239-42.
72. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 906 (1988).
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is in fact enforcing private intentions. This intentionalist model necessitates assuming
that the person who succeeded to the promisor's estate has assented to the obligation
even though he may never have expressed his consent. The purchaser manifested her
assent simply by purchasing land subject to a discoverable obligation. The obligation is
not law-imposed but privately created, and the whole regime of land-use obligations
running with the land is thereby erected on the foundation of free choice. 7 3
The idea of homeowner assent to covenants running with the land by
virtue of the act of purchase is one of the central tenets of the
contractual theory. By employing this mechanism to signify consent
by the homeowner, however, the contractual approach necessarily
rests upon the assumption "that consumers make rational,
economically efficient choices in housing purchase decisions. '74
Perhaps the biggest strength of the contractual model is its
almost clinical simplicity. By relying on a heavily market-driven view
of consent, the contractual approach posits a straightforward black-
letter rule with no gray area. For this reason, courts 75 and
commentators that value stability and predictability generally favor
the contractual approach. 76
Due to the small amount of flexibility permitted by the
contractual approach, courts engage in limited review of the
substantive restrictions imposed by associations on their members.
For the most part, courts will look only to the process through which
the restriction was adopted in determining whether to uphold a
restriction.7 7 Occasionally, however, courts will also engage in a
perfunctory analysis of whether or not a substantive association
regulation is "reasonable. s78
Arguably, "reasonableness" is not a true standard of review.
Rather, it is a way for a court to substitute its own substantive value
judgments in rare instances when it finds an association regulation to
be repugnant to its own subjective definition of "reasonableness. ' 79
Along these same lines, commentators have criticized
73. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 883, 889 (1988).
74. Brower, supra note 53, at 239.
75. In this Part, the term "courts" generally refers to all courts (local, state, or federal) that
have occasion to consider the legality of homeowner association regulations.
76. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) (arguing that a private approach to property law with
little public regulation is the best approach).
77. The prevailing judicial practice also reflects the fact that the majority of legislative
enactments dealing with homeowner association regulations "focus on process-based controls."
Brower, supra note 53, at 228.
78. See Kress, supra note 40, at 843-44 (discussing reasonableness review in California
courts).
79. Brower, supra note 53, at 236.
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"reasonableness" review by comparing it to traditional substantive due
process analysis and arguing that this practice "permit[s] reviewing
judges to substitute their standards of wisdom and fairness"80 in the
face of clearly written regulations.8' Despite concerns over the use of
the "reasonableness" standard, courts rarely strike down association
regulations on the grounds that they are unreasonable.8 2
2. Limitations of the Contractual/Consent Approach as Applied to
Political Sign Bans
Despite the appeal of its ordered simplicity, the contractual
model is flawed. As applied to the issue of political sign bans, the
contractual model is problematic for two very important reasons.
First, there is a lack of meaningful consent to the restriction. Second,
homeowners have a lack of meaningful choice due to the homogeneity
of most housing markets.8 3
a. Lack of Meaningful Consent
The notion of consent relied upon by the contractual model is
inapposite in the homeowner association context due to the nature of
the transaction and the way in which covenants are bundled by the
associations. In the contractual model, homeowner consent is
premised on the idea that purchasing with notice of restrictions, either
actual or constructive, equals consent. One scholar has observed,
"With consent to servitudes constructively inferred, their acceptance
by homebuyers reflects little autonomous will."8 4  The problem of
inferred consent is compounded in the homeowner association context
by the almost non-existent bargaining power possessed by the
homeowner in this transaction. In most homeowner associations,
80. NATELSON, supra note 47, at 133-34.
81. In the administrative law realm, "reasonableness" is a principle of restraint used as a
tool to prevent rather than enable judicial overreaching. In United States v. Mead Corp., the
Supreme Court stated:
[A] reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally
conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the
agency's chosen resolution seems unwise . . . but is obliged to accept the agency's
position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's
interpretation is reasonable ....
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
82. NATELSON, supra note 47, at 133-34.
83. See supra notes 71-72 (pointing out that dissenters to a restriction enacted through a
non-unanimous vote should not be seen as having given meaningful consent to the restriction).
84. Winokur, supra note 42, at 62.
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numerous servitudes are commonly "bundled" together with the real
estate.8 5 Consequently, a purchaser's ability to select or decline the
terms and restrictions governing her purchase is severely limited.
Since prospective homebuyers are not able to dicker over
individual terms and restrictions imposed upon them by homeowner
associations, it is almost impossible for a homeowner to manifest
explicit consent to individual terms. When it comes to the restrictions
imposed on a development by the declaration, it is an all-or-nothing
proposition for the homeowner, who must either take or leave the
entire package. Arguably, a prospective buyer's ability to walk away
from a transaction and purchase a home in a "competing" association
will lead to an efficient marketplace in which homeowner preferences
are optimized. In many housing markets, however, lack of
differentiation between competing developments counteracts this
notion.8 6
This lack of differentiation is compounded by the fact that all
homeowners automatically become members of their respective
associations once they purchase their homes.8 7  One scholar has
focused on the compulsory nature of membership as a cause for
concern when analyzing whether residents give meaningful consent to
be bound by association rules and regulations.88 If it were common
practice to separate the act of purchasing from the act of consenting to
the restrictions enforced by the homeowner association, then the
contractual model's theory of consent may not be so problematic.
In the context of political sign bans the consent problem
becomes even murkier because this particular type of restriction is not
typically something that a new homebuyer is likely to be cognizant of
when purchasing an association home. Since the culture of free
speech is so central to our democratic society,8 9 it is quite likely that
many homebuyers have no inkling that they could be subjected to such
a restriction in their own homes. As a result, actual knowledge of the
restriction may only be gained when the homeowner desires to engage
in the prohibited conduct and is denied permission to do so.
Situations such as these are the kind that can cause great tension due
to the dissonance between buyer expectations and reality. What the
85. Alexander, supra note 73, at 894 (discussing the "bundling" problem).
86. For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.2.b (discussing the lack of meaningful choice
for homebuyers because of the homogeneity of housing markets).
87. See supra Part I.B.1 (overview of homeowner associations).
88. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 146-47.
89. See infra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing the importance of free speech as a constitutional
value and an indispensable aspect of a democracy).
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homeowner believes she is consenting to when she purchases her
home and what she is actually consenting to are often incongruous.
b. Lack of Meaningful Choice
In many housing markets, the lack of meaningful consumer
choice also creates serious problems for the contractual model.
Proponents of association living argue that residents accept certain
burdens when they choose to live in an association-governed
neighborhood. Others have questioned whether residents really have
a meaningful choice in accepting the burdens along with the benefits.
In many housing markets, 90 consumer choice is relatively limited
because most available housing is organized under the homeowner
association model, and most homeowner associations provide similar
services, fees, and restrictions. 91
As association-governed communities become simultaneously
more common and more similar to one another,92 consumer choice is
increasingly limited. 93 Thus, the claim that buyers have a substantial
amount of choice in the marketplace is somewhat dubious. The
uniformity of the bundled restrictions offered by competing
developments becomes a larger problem as markets grow more
homogeneous. 94
Even those who refuse to accept the argument that market
homogeneity is a meaningful limitation on overall consumer choice,
must acknowledge that sign bans, political or otherwise, are apt to be
included as "standard" aesthetic regulations in almost all homeowner
association declarations. 95 This creates a vicious cycle because if one
association includes such a ban, there is the tendency for all similarly
situated associations in the same geographic region to include that
very same ban.96 Rather than giving consumers increased choice in
90. This is especially true in two of the country's most populous states: California and
Florida. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 11.
91. DILGER, supra note 8, at 95-96; see also Winokur, supra note 42, at 58-59 (discussing
the recent growth of homeowner associations and the standardization of restrictions).
92. See supra Part II.A (detailing the rapid expansion of homeowner associations in the last
several decades).
93. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 12.
94. See Winokur, supra note 42, at 58-62 (discussing characteristics of real estate
transactions that are factors in the standardization of servitude regimes).
95. See id. at 58-59 (discussing the standardization of servitude regimes).
96. Because developers tend to be repeat players in certain areas of the country, association
regulations are often templates that are simply cut and pasted from one development to another.
Thus, once a restriction gets included in one declaration it is almost always going to be included
in the declarations of subsequent developments. See id. (discussing the standardization of real
estate documents and the widespread use of boilerplate language in servitudes).
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order to differentiate themselves, homeowner associations are actually
inclined to preserve their underlying similarities and maintain the
status quo.
Furthermore, just as membership in a homeowner association
is automatic, membership cannot be resigned unless a homeowner
sells her house and moves out. Thus, there are very high exit costs for
a homeowner who wishes to extricate herself from a particular
association. 97 From a practical perspective, when the only alternative
is selling one's house and moving, many homeowners will simply bear
the negative consequences of undesirable regulations.
C. Constitutional Approach
1. Overview
In contrast to the contractual approach, the constitutional
approach is a less traditional way to characterize homeowner
associations and their attendant legal responsibilities. It seems only
natural that those opposed to the regulation of free speech, and
political speech in particular, would invoke the First Amendment to
supply a remedy. However, it is well established that the Constitution
only prohibits actions by private actors when they are fairly
attributable to the State; the Constitution "erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. 98
For this reason, scholars and litigants have been eager to make
the case that the actions of homeowner associations are fairly
attributable to the State and deserve to be restricted according to the
dictates of the Constitution. This assertion is not unfounded given the
large number of analogies that can be drawn between homeowner
associations and local governments.9 9 While the Court has developed
a handful of state action theories over the past several decades, two
seem particularly applicable to the homeowner association context: 100
97. Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1415
(1994).
98. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
99. See supra Part II.B.3-4 (noting the vital role of local governments in the establishment
and growth of homeowner associations, and the similar characteristics that such associations
share with local governments).
100. The decision to focus on these two theories of state action is based upon my conclusion
that these theories have the most applicability to the association context. As to the public
function theory, this conclusion is driven by the fact that the problem of political sign bans
involves a conflict between property rights and free speech; the precise problem dealt with by
Marsh and its progeny. See infra text accompanying notes 101-114 (discussing the public
function theory and relevant case law). As to the symbiotic relationship theory, the role that local
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(1) the public function theory; and (2) the symbiotic relationship
theory.
2. Public Function Theory
The public function theory is rooted in the seminal state action
case, Marsh v. Alabama.10 1 Marsh considered the case of Grace
Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, who was convicted of criminal
trespassing for distributing religious literature on the streets of a
privately owned "company town."'10 2 The key issue before the Court
was whether a private company, the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation,
that owned and operated the "company town" of Chickasaw, Alabama,
should be recognized as the equivalent of the State for the purposes of
the First Amendment. 10 3 The Court held that, as applied to Ms.
Marsh, the Alabama criminal trespass statute was an
unconstitutional abridgement of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.104
Central to the Court's holding in Marsh was the striking
similarity between Chickasaw and other typical American towns of its
era. In an oft-cited passage, Justice Black wrote:
The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that it has all the characteristics of any other
American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business places are
situated.
10 5
One lasting legacy of this passage has been the scholarly and judicial
focus on Justice Black's assertion that Chickasaw possessed all, rather
than merely some or most, of the characteristics of a typical American
town. As subsequently interpreted, this language set the bar very
high for courts to find that a private entity assumed all, or at least a
sufficiently large number, of the traditional public functions in a given
locality to merit a finding of state action. 10 6
governments play in the planning and functioning of most common-interest communities seems
to resemble, at least arguably, the level of state involvement required by the Court in this line of
cases. See supra Part II.B.3-4 (analyzing the involvement of local governments in homeowner
associations and the benefits that the government derives from the existence of these
communities); see also infra text accompanying notes 115-120 (discussing the symbiotic
relationship theory and relevant case law).
101. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
102. Id. at 503-04.
103. Id. at 502.
104. Id. at 509-10.
105. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
106. During its initial attempt to clarify Marsh, the Court temporarily expanded its reading
of the public function doctrine in the so-called "shopping center cases." In Amalgamated Food
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At first blush, the homeowner association seems to be the
modern analogue to the company town found in Marsh. As one
scholar argues, the primary holding of Marsh can be viewed as a
''narrow expansion of constitutional protection applicable only to
company towns and other privately owned communities that are the
'functional equivalent of ... municipali[ties]'...."107
If homeowner associations are viewed in the eyes of the law as
the functional equivalents of municipalities, just as company towns
were in the 1940s, then this "functional equivalent" argument has
substantial merit. From a functional standpoint, there are
similarities between homeowner associations and municipalities
because most associations provide services such as street cleaning,
trash collection, snow removal, and maintenance of common areas.108
In addition, associations also impose zoning-type regulations like
those usually imposed by local governments, such as building and
occupancy restrictions. 10 9 Because of these similarities, one scholar
argues that the Court's public function paradigm, as first articulated
in Marsh and later clarified in the shopping center cases," 0 should be
updated to encompass certain types of association-governed
communities."'
The public function theory of state action is further complicated
by its ill-defined parameters. The cleanest articulation of the public
function theory can be found in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn. 12 In Rendell-
Baker, the Court asserted that a private entity might fall under the
umbrella of the public function theory of state action if the function
performed was one that was "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the Court held that a shopping center was "the
functional equivalent of [the] 'business block' [in Chickasaw] and for First Amendment purposes
must be treated in substantially the same manner." 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968). However, the
Court quickly halted this expansion, first in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) and
finally in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). In Hudgens, the
Court announced that Logan Valley had been formally overruled and essentially adopted the
position of Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley. 424 U.S. at 518-21. Justice Black wrote:
The question is, [u]nder what circumstances can private property be treated as though
it were public? The answer that Marsh gives is when that property has taken on all
the attributes of a town, i.e., "residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business places are situated."
Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 332 (Black, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
107. Siegel, supra note 25, at 473.
108. Id. at 476-77; see also supra Part II.B.4 (detailing ways in which homeowner
associations are similar to municipalities in the services they provide).
109. Siegel, supra note 25, at 476-77.
110. See supra note 106 for a discussion of the shopping center cases.
111. Siegel, supra note 25, at 482-89.
112. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
2006]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the State."'113 While this seems to lend clarity to the analysis, it may
actually raise more questions than it answers because the inquiry is
necessarily an incredibly fact-intensive exercise, 114 which can yield
vastly different results from case to case.
3. Symbiotic Relationship Theory
At its core, the symbiotic relationship theory of state action
relies upon the premise that if the government is so intimately
involved in certain private activity, it defies logic and common sense to
characterize this activity as anything other than the work of the State.
The first case that sketched out the parameters of what would become
the symbiotic relationship theory was Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority. In Burton, the Court held that the exclusion of an African-
American patron from a restaurant solely on the basis of race was
discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 The Court's decision turned on the
fact that the restaurant was operated by a private owner who leased
the premises from the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of
the State. Significantly, the Court stated that "the State has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle
[restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity.""16
In subsequent cases, the joint participation element came to be
the key component of the Court's analysis under the symbiotic
relationship theory. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,"17 the
Court articulated the test somewhat differently when it wrote, "[T]he
inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.""18
At present, the concept of "a sufficiently close nexus" between the
State and a private actor remains the central focus of the Court's
inquiry when applying the symbiotic relationship theory.
113. Id. at 842.
114. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (discussing the state
action doctrine generally and concluding that when courts determine whether the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to nominally private conduct this "can be determined only in the framework
of the peculiar facts or circumstances present").
115. Id. at 716-17.
116. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
117. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
118. Id. at 351.
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As previously discussed, 119 the symbiotic relationship theory of
state action may be applicable to homeowner associations for several
reasons. First, associations are the result of conscious policy choices
by local municipalities. Second, associations and local government act
as partners in revenue collection and/or service delivery. 120
4. Limitations of the Constitutional Approach as Applied to Political
Sign Bans
a. Public Function Theory
Despite the functional similarities between associations and
local governments, several major problems arise when applying the
public function theory to homeowner associations. 121  With few
exceptions, 122 homeowner associations fall short of Marsh's mandate
that a private entity must take over all public functions traditionally
performed by the State in order to be considered a state actor. The
absence of a business district from most homeowner associations is
one of the main factors that prevents a complete Marsh analogy.
Because homeowner associations are, by their very nature, almost
uniformly one-dimensional in their residential character, this is a
problem that is not easily overcome. While one commentator has
argued that the Chickasaw/company town paradigm needs to be
refreshed for the modern era, 23 there is little evidence in the years
since the shopping center cases were decided that the Court is willing
to engage in such a revision to the doctrine. 24
Those eager to apply the public function theory to homeowner
associations may point to the laundry list of similarities between
associations and local governments. 25 In response to this argument,
one commentator wrote, "Those advocating the application of the
Constitution to private associations offer nothing more than a thinly
veiled substantive choice among competing normative values."'126 In
119. See supra Part II.B.3-4.
120. Siegel, supra note 25, at 520-24.
121. Reichman, supra note 8, at 253.
122. One exception could arise in the case of mixed-use developments governed by
associations. A mixed-use development "includes residential and commercial elements, and may
also include recreational and other components." HYATT, supra note 16, at 18.
123. Siegel, supra note 25, at 489-90.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 130-141 (discussing the symbiotic relationship
theory).
125. See supra Part II.B.4.
126. Brower, supra note 53, at 254.
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other words, associations only appear to resemble state actors, as
traditionally defined by the Court, because certain parties have a
social or political agenda that requires them to be viewed as such.
Perhaps the best hope for a successful application of the public
function theory to association bans on political signs is a
reconsideration of the shopping center cases along the lines suggested
by Justice Marshall in his Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board
dissent. Justice Marshall wrote:
The underlying concern in Marsh was that traditional public channels of communication
remain free, regardless of the incidence of ownership. Given that concern, the crucial fact
in Marsh was that the company owned the traditional forums essential for effective
communication; it was immaterial that the company also owned a sewer system and
that its property in other respects resembled a town.
12 7
By dispensing with the requirement that a private entity possess all of
the incidents of a normal town to qualify as a state actor, and instead
focusing on the question of private control over "traditional public
channels of communication," Justice Marshall offered an approach
that is applicable to the association context. Since homeowner
associations exercise control over the display of political signs on land
incident to privately owned homes (a traditional public channel of
communication), this may be sufficient to satisfy the state action
requirement. 128 In other words, if a court were to accept Marshall's
argument that Marsh's holding was driven by Gulfs control over the
traditional public forums and means of communication in Chickasaw,
then it may be immaterial that most association-governed
communities do not have "all the characteristics of any other
American town." 129
b. Symbiotic Relationship Theory
Under the symbiotic relationship theory, it would also be
difficult to support the claim that the State is a joint actor with a
homeowner association. While local governments are typically
127. Hudgens v. Nat'l. Labor Rel. Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 539 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (emphasis
added).
128. Although Justice Marshall does not explicitly discuss this in his Hudgens dissent, I
would argue that such a finding of state action should be confined solely to the issue of political
sign bans or any other related First Amendment claims. Thus, the scope of a state action holding
based on the fact that a homeowner association controlled a "traditional public channel of
communication" would activate the First Amendment to protect the impermissibly regulated
speech; it would not necessarily attach the full breadth of constitutional restrictions normally
placed on the government. In essence, this would be an issue-specific application of the state
action doctrine.
129. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946) (emphasis added).
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involved in the preliminary stages of association development, 130 it is
difficult to argue that they have much lasting involvement with the
administration of homeowner associations.
Some have argued that homeowner associations are the result
of conscious policy choices by local municipalities, which, in turn,
create virtual partnerships between associations and local
governments, 131 but this argument is problematic because the Court
has set the bar very high for finding state action under the symbiotic
relationship theory. In finding, or refusing to find, the symbiotic
relationship test satisfied, the Court has stressed that the private
entity must "insinuate itself into a position of interdependence"'' 32
with the State or have a "sufficiently close nexus"133 with the State. In
light of precedent, and the narrowing scope of its application, most
homeowner associations are not likely to be classified as state actors
under the symbiotic relationship theory. As a practical matter, the
list of private entities that have not met the Court's stringent test
include: a private club licensed by the State, 134 a privately owned
electric utility heavily regulated by the State as a government-
approved monopoly,1 35 and a private school1 36 and private nursing
home1 37 that were both funded, licensed, and regulated by the State.
Other difficulties with the symbiotic relationship theory as
applied to homeowner associations are the lack of a principled test to
guide its application and the heavy dependence upon case-by-case
factual analysis. 138 As the Court stated in Burton, "Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of
the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."'139
Likewise, one scholar commented, "In virtually every case, however,
the ultimate question seems to be factually based, with state action
being applied when 'the facts warrant such a finding.""' 40 By engaging
in a fact-based totality-of-the-circumstances test, findings of state
action become very subjective determinations, which have the
130. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the relationship between associations and local
governments).
131. See Siegel, supra note 25, at 520-24 (connecting the recent growth of homeowner
associations with local governmental interests).
132. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 715 (1961).
133. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 345 (1974).
134. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
135. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
136. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 830 (1982).
137. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
138. The public function theory suffers from this same shortcoming.
139. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
140. Wohl & Rishikoff, supra note 64, at 530.
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potential to be influenced by the court's sympathies toward the
underlying claim presented by the litigant. 141 As a practical matter,
this uncertainty may deter homeowners who wish to challenge these
bans in court under the symbiotic relationship theory.
c. The State Action Doctrine Generally
The Court's growing hostility to the state action doctrine itself
over the last several decades is another relevant consideration that
limits the utility of the constitutional approach in challenging
homeowner associations' political sign bans. After a period of
expansion that lasted until the 1970s,142 the Court has limited the
scope of the doctrine in recent years.143 In most recent cases, the
Court has declined to find state action unless the factual
circumstances closely mirror past precedent. 144
One plausible explanation for this trend is that the Court
created the state action doctrine in order to remedy social wrongs that
Congress had failed to address. 145 For example, the Court was apt to
find state action in the post-war era, but curtailed such findings after
the enactment of much of the federal civil rights legislation in the
1960s and 1970s.146 Essentially, the Court used state action as a tool
of judicial activism at a time when the legislature remained silent on
pressing issues such as racial discrimination and segregation. Once
Congress stepped in to prohibit discrimination in numerous private
141. In fairness to judges, the extreme subjectivity of the state action analysis can cut the
other way as well by encouraging judicial restraint.
142. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961); Adickes v. H.S. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). The expansion of the state action
doctrine effectively came to a halt with a series of key cases in the 1970s. See generally Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Hudgens v. Nat'l. Labor Rel. Bd., 424 U.S. 507
(1976); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
143. One possible exception is Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). In Brentwood Academy, the Court held that there was state
action due to the "pervasive entwinement" between a nominally private organization, the
Athletic Association, and the State. While some have characterized this as a new test for state
action, others have argued that it is merely a recasting of the symbiotic relationship test. See
supra Parts III.C.3, III.C.4.b.
144. Six such cases fit this mold. See generally Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 163; Metropolitan
Edison, 419 U.S. at 345; Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 149; Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
145. In the mid-twentieth century, problems of racial discrimination by private parties were
sometimes addressed vis-A-vis the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1; Burton,
365 U.S. at 715. This insight is derived directly from Professor Thomas McCoy's in-class lectures
concerning the state action doctrine at Vanderbilt Law School in fall of 2004.
146. The 1964 Civil Rights Act is the cornerstone of this trend.
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contexts, judicial intervention on this front became less critical.
Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court made a concerted effort to refrain
from engaging in this type of judicial activism. Assuming that the
Roberts Court will carry on this ethos of judicial restraint, it will be
very difficult to break new ground in the realm of state action.
IV. PROPOSAL: LIMITATION ON ASSOCIATION REGULATION OF POLITICAL
SIGNS BASED ON PUBLIC POLICY
A. The Remedy: Traditional Contract Law Public Policy Justification
for Holding Political Sign Bans Unenforceable
Given the problems presented by homeowner associations and
the limitations of the existing analytical frameworks when applied to
the issue of political sign bans, a new approach is necessary to address
these concerns. A sensible place to start is by combining the core
insights of the two existing frameworks while minimizing their
problematic aspects. The core insight of the contractual approach is
that, at a minimum, parties come to the community with constructive
knowledge of homeowner association restrictions. If this assumption
is correct, then courts generally should uphold such restrictions.
Courts should make an exception, however, with respect to
restrictions that (1) impair the ability of individuals to freely express
themselves in their homes; and (2) impede open and honest discourse
relating to electoral politics. 147 Protecting these values is the core
insight of the constitutional approach. This insight requires courts to
invalidate political sign bans on public policy grounds.
A limited exception to the contractual approach for political
sign bans does not require judicial adoption of a public policy
exception to freedom of contract when reviewing association
regulations generally. 148 Rather, it requires a more modest change.
Invalidation of contracts, or specific contract terms, based on the
concept that they are contrary to public policy is a well-established
147. The public policy concern outlined in this Section, which focuses primarily on the
detrimental effects that political sign bans may have on individual rights and the proper
functioning of our democratic system of government, is compounded by the concerns discussed
earlier in Part III.B; namely, lack of meaningful consent by homeowners to the restrictions
imposed upon them by associations and lack of meaningful choice for homeowners between
competing associations within a particular geographic region.
148. One commentator has advocated judicial adoption of a public policy exception to




practice in our common law tradition. 149  When interpreting a
contract, courts seek to give effect to the intent of the parties. As an
initial matter, courts attempt to gauge the intent of the parties by
focusing on the specific language contained within the written
document that memorializes the parties' agreement. Courts parse the
language of the contract by construing the specific terms in accordance
with their plain meaning and other generally accepted canons of
construction. However, there are certain special instances when a
court recognizes that an external control "imposed by the world
around the bargain" 150 trumps the plain meaning of the contract
language. In these cases, courts may choose not to enforce a contract,
or a specific contract term, on the grounds that it is against public
policy.151
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a contract
term may be unenforceable if "the interest in its enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms."'152 Furthermore, a court may elect to
strike down certain problematic terms as against public policy based
on "its own perception of the need to protect some aspect of the public
welfare."'153 In many instances, the "against public policy" rationale
for unenforceability is synonymous with illegality. For example, "A
contract may be contrary to public policy because the performance
that is bargained for is against public policy. [Thus], a contract to set
up a gaming business may be contrary to public policy because the
creation of a gaming enterprise and gaming are illegal."'154 However,
illegality is not a necessary condition for unenforceability of a contract
term on public policy grounds. The need to protect some critical
aspect of the public welfare underpins the public policy exception to
freedom of contract. Thus, "a court may determine a public policy and
may determine that a particular contract contradicts that policy by
simply evaluating the prevailing practices and notions of the
149. "The law has a long history of recognizing the general rule that certain contracts,
though properly entered into in all other respects, will not be enforced, or at least will not be
enforced fully, if found to be contrary to public policy." CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1 (2004).
150. RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., CONTRACT LAW 572 (6th ed. 2003).
151. Although this Note advocates a public policy approach based primarily upon contract
law principles, an almost identical public policy exception is also well-established in the law of
servitudes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmts. e-f (2000) (discussing
judicial authority to hold certain privately created servitudes invalid as a matter of public
policy).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1978).
153. Id. § 178 cmt. b.
154. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1 (2004).
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community as to what is in the interest of the general welfare of the
society."155
There are understandable objections to the public policy
approach. Courts ordinarily review the process, not the terms or
substance, of association rules and rulemaking. 156 This limited review
reduces the risk of judicial arbitrariness and subjectivity. However, in
the case of political sign bans, this level of review under-protects the
important value of free speech. The new approach proposed by this
Note attempts to strike a sensible balance between these competing
concerns. As the following Section shows, the balance must tip in
favor of free speech over association bans on political signs.
B. The Reasoning: Analogous to the Reasons that Core Political Speech
Is Protected from Governmental Interference by the First Amendment
Although political signs often are small in size, their
significance is enormous. Indeed, political signs vindicate the values
at the heart of the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
Furthermore, the importance of such speech, i.e. core political speech
that directly contributes to the "marketplace of ideas,"157 is not
diminished in a neighborhood operated by a private homeowner
association. It is axiomatic that the principal aims served by free
speech in the United States are (1) promoting individual autonomy,
self-expression, and self-fulfillment; and (2) facilitating representative
democracy and self-government. 158 The remainder of this Part
demonstrates that a public policy approach to association regulation of
political signs is justified because political signs are a vital mechanism
by which to advance these core principles.
155. Id. § 79.2.
156. Brower, supra note 53, at 228-31.
157. The phrase "marketplace of ideas" is derived primarily from a notable passage in
Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market ....
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).




1. Individual Rights Concern: Tradition of Special Respect for
Individual Liberty in the Home
Dating back to colonial times, the "freedom of one's house" has
been at the core of the American conception of individual liberty. 159
The Third and Fourth Amendments integrated this freedom into our
constitutional scheme to prevent unwanted and unjustified intrusion
into the home by the government. 160 In modern times, this freedom
has also been recognized by implication, most notably in the series of
Supreme Court cases developing the "right to privacy."'61
The centrality of the home to the American conception of
individual liberty embodies the fundamental belief that property is the
guardian of personal liberty. 162 The essence of personal liberty, in
turn, is the ability to express one's self and one's viewpoints freely and
without interference. Thus, as a practical matter, one's home allows
an individual to have an unregulated forum for free expression and
self-realization. So long as the law prevents the government from
intruding into the home, individual liberty and self-expression will
thrive.
In Stanley v. Georgia, a First Amendment obscenity case,
Justice Marshall wrote,
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds.
16 3
Although Stanley by no means provides a perfect analogy to political
sign bans,' 6 4 Justice Marshall's words reverberate in this context by
emphasizing that the cultivation of one's own intellectual, moral,
political, and sexual self within one's home is an undertaking that is
zealously protected by the traditions of our culture and our legal
system. Accordingly, any intrusion into this protected realm
159. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 597 n.45 (1980) (quoting John Adams, 2 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)).
160. U.S. CONST. amends. III & IV.
161. The "right to privacy" was first articulated in the Court's landmark decision Griswold v.
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Later cases applied the right to privacy in other contexts,
namely abortion. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
162. Winokur, supra note 42, at 43.
163. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
164. Again, I emphasize this point because I am not advocating the finding of state action or
the application of the First Amendment to homeowner associations. I am merely using the
rationale that underpins the First Amendment's free speech protection as the theoretical
foundation for making a public policy argument.
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necessarily requires the strongest justification and the utmost
restraint.
Political sign bans do substantial damage to this ideal. In a
very meaningful way, association bans on political signs wreak the
same havoc on "men's minds" as the obscenity laws at issue in Stanley.
As one commentator observed, "In a society which increasingly
abstracts and renders fungible so much in our lives, we should protect
opportunities to be peculiarly one's self, even at the expense of the
neighbors' heightened aesthetic sensibilities ".... 165 By restricting
one of the most powerful forms of free speech that can be undertaken
on one's own property, often in the name of "aesthetic sensibilities,"
political sign bans erode the traditional respect that our society places
on individual liberty and self-expression in the home.
Furthermore, assuming that the exercise of free speech
promotes individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment, 166
there is substantial societal value in protecting that very exercise in
the home because it is the forum where most individuals feel most
secure engaging in it. This assertion carries special significance in
relation to political signs because the location where this particular
type of speech occurs adds invaluable credibility to the content of the
message. Since the display of a political sign "signal[s] the resident's
support for particular candidates, parties, or causes,"1167 it is a form of
political speech, which is inextricably linked to the identity and
community reputation of the speaker. Although their size and
mobility allow for the display of political signs in many locations, there
is no more profound statement of one's beliefs than to sing them from
the rooftop, quite literally, of one's own home. By invoking public
policy to invalidate association bans on political signs, courts can
preserve our cultural and legal tradition of guarding the home as a
precious sanctuary of individual liberty and self-expression.
2. Systemic Rights Concern: Protecting the Marketplace of Ideas and
the Proper Functioning of Our Democratic System
When a free man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone else, by
some scholar or administrator or legislator. The voters must have it, all of them. The
primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as
possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.
1 6 8
165. Winokur, supra note 42, at 74-75.
166. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 158, at 959.
167. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).




Beyond the individual rights rationale, a second justification
for the public policy approach emanates from the concept that free
expression is a right derived implicitly from the role that public debate
and elections play in our democratic system of government. In Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten,169 Judge Learned Hand began the movement
away from the notion that free speech is solely an individual right by
characterizing the right of free speech in the collective, as the source of
governmental authority in a democratic society. 170
Over the years, many scholars, most notably Dr. Alexander
Meiklejohn, expanded on Judge Hand's conception of free speech as a
systemic right 171 that is clearly inferable from our constitutional
structure of government. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
the Supreme Court cited Meiklejohn, and others, when it wrote, "The
First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free
expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has
a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government."'172  Similarly, Professor Emerson also
articulated the fundamental role that free speech plays in our
democratic system when he wrote:
The crucial point, however, is not that freedom of expression is politically useful, but
that it is indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government. Once one
accepts the premise of the Declaration of Independence-that governments derive "their
just powers from the consent of the governed"-it follows that the governed must, in
order to exercise their right of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming
individual judgments and in forming the common judgment. 17 3
The role that free expression plays in fostering our democratic
system of self-government is most clearly exemplified by one
particularly vital act: voting. Thus, the need to zealously guard free
speech in our society "is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage.' ' 174 Without the protections afforded by the principles of free
speech, the electoral process that is at the core of the American
democratic system of government becomes de-legitimized.
169. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
170. Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment:
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990) (emphasis added).
171. Some analogous terms include: "structural right," "collective right," or "societal right."
My use of the term "systemic right" encompasses these and other similar terms.
172. 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).
173. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 883 (1963).
174. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 168, at 27.
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Political sign bans imposed by homeowner associations are a
dangerous rebuke to the argument that free speech serves an exalted
purpose in our system of government. While Hand and Meiklejohn
were primarily concerned about governmental interference with
speech, the reasoning behind their concerns is no less applicable when
private homeowner associations interfere with the free speech of their
members in their homes. An individual voter's ability to contribute to
the marketplace of ideas, or her opportunity to be influenced by that
very same marketplace, should not be stifled simply because she
chooses to live in a community governed by a homeowner association.
A voter's role in the proper functioning of our democratic system of
government is equally important regardless of her home address. As
the Supreme Court has asserted, political "[s]igns that react to a local
happening or express a view on a controversial issue both reflect and
animate change in the life of a community."'175
Without the ability to display political signs on private
property, communities, and more specifically elections, may evolve
into empty voids within the democratic landscape where only a few
select voices will be heard concerning the candidates or the issues. As
Professor Emerson wrote, "It is through the [electoral] process that
most of the immediate decisions on the survival, welfare and progress
of a society are made .... Freedom of expression in the political realm
is usually a necessary condition for securing freedom elsewhere."'176 If
this "necessary condition" is missing or significantly diminished in its
scope by bans on political signs, then the maintenance of a fully
optimized electoral process, fueled by lively and robust public debate,
becomes increasingly difficult. 177 Accordingly, the electoral process is
at risk of being gutted of its intended constitutional purpose as the
mechanism to secure "the consent of the governed."178
Avoiding over-generalization, it is not far-fetched to presume
that many Americans gain awareness, especially during the early
stages of election season, about political candidates and issues while
driving through the streets of their local community and viewing the
political signs displayed on their neighbors' lawns. 79 The home is an
175. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994).
176. Emerson, supra note 173, at 883.
177. Meiklejohn argues that fostering "robust public debate" is the central function of the
First Amendment. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 168, at 75 ("The primary purpose of the First
Amendment is, then, that all citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear
upon our common life.").
178. Emerson, supra note 173, at 883.
179. This premise is even stronger when considering local elections where in-depth media
coverage and television advertising are going to be at a minimum.
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especially powerful forum from which to voice one's political
viewpoints. The placement of a political sign on one's property is an
unequivocal declaration of one's political beliefs for all to see and,
more importantly, consider for themselves. As one commentator
noted, "[Political campaign signs] have maximum effect when they go
up in the windows of homes, for this demonstrates that citizens of the
district are supporting your candidate-an impact that money can't
buy."180 Moreover, when taken in the aggregate, the sheer number of
signs for a particular political candidate throughout a given
community can signal the relative strength or weakness of a
particular political viewpoint; information that could bear on a voter's
ultimate Election Day decision.
The Framers recognized "that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be the fundamental principle of the American
government."''18 Political signs are simple, yet powerful,
communicative tools for modern voters to express their political beliefs
and stave off the inertia that threatens our democratic system.
C. The Application: Fashioning an Approach Based on the Supreme
Court's "Time, Place, and Manner" Cases
Courts should recognize a public policy exception to the general
freedom of contract because political signs are core political speech
and implicate the most fundamental values of the First Amendment.
However, courts need not be insensitive to the motivation behind most
association sign regulations: a desire to keep the community
"attractive and livable"'1 2 by controlling the creation of too much litter
and visual clutter. This raises an important question: when applying
the public policy exception, how should courts evaluate association
regulations of political signs given that such regulations are generally
motivated by legitimate interests? To answer this question, courts
should fashion an approach based on the Supreme Court's well-
established "time, place, and manner" approach to unintentional
infringements of protected First Amendment speech.18 3
180. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 55 n.12 (quoting DICK SIMPSON, WINNING ELECTIONS: A HANDBOOK
IN PARTICIPATORY POLITICS 87 (rev. ed. 1981)).
181. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
182. Community Association Institute, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),
http://www.caionline.org/faq.cfm#4 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
183. See generally Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of handbills); Martin
v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door canvassing); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)
(raucous noises); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (student anti-segregation protest at
courthouse); Heffron v. Int'l. Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKON), 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
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The "time, place, and manner" cases establish that courts
should tolerate regulations that accidentally interfere with the
exercise of free speech as long as the interference is merely incidental
to some other significant state interest.18 4 In Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, the Court articulated its standard for
analyzing regulatory interferences with free speech under the "time,
place, and manner" paradigm as follows: 18 5
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable
time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that restrictions of this kind
are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information. 
18 6
The Court's "time, place, and manner" balancing test weighs the
interests inherent in a particular type of speech against the
government's interest in regulating that speech indirectly in the name
of public order, safety, aesthetics, or tranquility, privacy, and
repose. 187
Integrating the "time, place, and manner" methodology into the
public policy exception for political sign regulations is eminently
sensible. In this context, the aesthetic concern is likely to be a
primary motivation behind the regulation.188 Despite the strong
justifications for a public policy exception,18 9 it would seem imprudent
to assert that such weighty concerns should remove all regulatory
power from homeowner associations to curb the potential aesthetic
drawbacks of political signs. For instance, a homeowner should not be
able to argue for a public policy exception in order to enable her to
(distribution of religious literature on state fair grounds); Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981) (billboards); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(posting signs on public property); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(sleeping in park during demonstration); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
(noise restrictions on use of band shell); Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 43 (residential signs); Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (anti-abortion protestors); Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (same); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000) (approaching a person near a healthcare facility).
184. By "incidental," I mean that the regulation is not directly intended to suppress a
particular substantive political viewpoint.
185. The modern formulation of the "time, place, and manner" balancing test comes from
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). However, the Court later refined the "time, place,
and manner" standard in Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
186. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
187. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 158, at 1197-1220.
188. See supra Part II.B.1-4 (arguing that one of the four main functions of a homeowner
association is to protect neighborhood aesthetics and real estate values).
189. See supra Part IV.B.1-2 (outlining both individual and systemic rights concerns).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
erect a twenty-foot tall political billboard on her front lawn. Such a
result would clearly be absurd.
To prevent such a scenario, courts should fashion an approach
similar to the balancing test articulated in Clark.190 When analyzing
a "time, place, and manner" regulation, courts will normally: (1) assess
the significance of the asserted governmental interests; and (2)
determine whether the State has employed the least restrictive means
available to achieve its asserted interests and minimize the
interference with the activity protected by the First Amendment. 19'
Courts should undertake a similar analysis in determining whether to
invalidate an association regulation of political signs. Courts should:
(1) assess the significance of the association's asserted interests in
regulating political signs, or external signs generally; 92 and (2)
determine whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the
association's interests while minimizing the interference with political
speech.
Indisputably, there are alternative ways for individuals to
advocate their political views outside of the home, but the reasoning
detailed above1 93 will ensure that an outright ban on all political signs
will fail the balancing test because there is clearly a less restrictive
means to achieve the association's interest. By contrast, it will be
considerably more challenging to apply the balancing test to an
association regulation that limits the size of political signs or the time
period during which political signs may be displayed.194 Although
speculating about the myriad different factual scenarios is not very
fruitful, courts will have to give careful consideration on a case-by-
case basis to the interests set forth by associations in light of the
extent of the interference with homeowners' free speech interests.
V. CONCLUSION
The influence that homeowner associations have over an ever-
increasing percentage of the population demands a more exacting
degree of scrutiny from the legal and academic community. Political
sign bans may only be the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the
190. See supra text accompanying note 186.
191. Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1981).
192. Again, in most instances this will be the desire to minimize litter and/or visual clutter.
193. See supra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing individual and systemic rights arguments).
194. These are simply two obvious examples of less restrictive regulations that could pass
muster under the proposed balancing analysis. In these two hypothetical cases, the outcome of
the balancing analysis is likely to be very fact-intensive.
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substantial effect that associations can have on individual liberty and
the proper functioning of our democratic system of government.
In arguing for a public policy approach to guide the legal
treatment and regulation of political signs in homeowner associations,
this Note advocates a proactive approach to this problem. By
expanding common law protections, 195  both associations and
homeowners can come out ahead in the final analysis. Under this
approach, homeowner associations can continue to operate and thrive
without the burden of being tagged as full-fledged state actors while
ceding only a small swath of their contractual and rulemaking
autonomy in the name of a broader societal good. Likewise,
homeowners can enjoy the essential free speech protections normally
guaranteed by the First Amendment and still gain all of the benefits
of association living.
Brian Jason Fleming*
195. Although this Note has argued for a common law remedy, the eventual adoption of state
statutory solutions to the political sign ban issue would be ideal because it would clarify the
rights of associations to regulate and homeowners to engage in this particular form of speech.
Florida is one example of a state that has enacted a statutory free speech right for association
residents. Brower, supra note 53, at 231. Additionally, state constitutional law may provide
another means to secure greater free speech protections for residents of private homeowner
associations. A recent New Jersey state appellate court decision held that, as a matter of state
constitutional law, homeowner associations may not abridge the rights of their members to
display political signs on their lawns. See Comm. for Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers
Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
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